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Abstract
Empirical evidence on the link between inequality and redistribution mechanisms is
inconclusive, and depends on the nature of the mechanism in question. We present a series of
political economy models, and the associated results may be interpreted as being consistent
with these facts. Specifically, we demonstrate that the link between inequality and
redistribution depends on the nature of the mechanism relative to the alternatives that are
available. Our analysis suggests that, in the presence of higher inequality, a median voter
faced with the choice of the proportion of expenditure between two mechanisms is likely to
choose in favour of public goods that are more efficient mechanisms of redistribution. In
some cases, inequality does not matter and the proportion of spending on any particular
public good is related only to the preference and technology related parameters of the model.
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Models with agent heterogeneity in some form yield interesting political economy 
perspectives on the determination of public policy.  For example, political economy 
models incorporating income inequality offer  an explanation for the link between 
inflation and inequality in terms of a desire for voters to redistribute income via an 
inflation-tax. (See Dolmas et al., 2000).  Heterogeneity in the form of demographic 
structure  has  had  implications  for  fiscal  policy  and  the  policy  on  immigration. 
(Storeslotten, 2000, and Dolmas and Huffman, 2004).   There is also a large body of 
literature on that explores the link between inequality and the provision of various 
types  of  public  goods,  or  more  generally  between  inequality  and  different 
mechanisms of redistribution.  (For a survey see Zweimuller 2000 and references 
therein). 
  Standard political-economy models with a median voter representation suggest that 
inequality has a positive impact on redistribution. (Gioacchino et al. 2005).  In recent 
years, however, motivated by the lack of empirical evidence in favour of a positive 
link, strands of literature have emerged that seek to justify a negative link between 
inequality and the expenditure on mechanisms of redistribution such as education, 
health, transfers etc.  The work of Benabou (2000), Zhang(2002), Gradstein(2003), 
for example, departs from the standard majority rule framework in order to explain a 
negative link between inequality and education. 
  This  paper  considers  two  fairly  standard  political  economy  models  in  order  to 
rationalize  why  the  empirical  evidence  on  the  link  between  inequality  and 
redistribution is somewhat inconclusive.  An aspect of the choice of the redistribution 
mechanism  that  has  often  been  neglected  in  the  literature  is  the  fact  that  public 
revenues  have  alternative  uses,  and  voters  may  prefer  some  mechanisms  of 
redistribution over others.  Of course, this neglect is partly due to the fact that median 
voter  characterization  of  the  political  process  does  not  accommodate  choice  over 
several alternatives.  However, one can always accommodate choice between two 
alternatives  by  a  vote  on  the  proportion  of  revenues  that  is  used  for  alternative 
schemes of redistribution. 
   To that end, the first model we present considers the proportion of tax revenue that 
is spent on a public good, which we refer to as “environment”, but may be interpreted 
as  any  other  public  good  with  a  non-excludable  nature.    The  remainder  of  tax 
revenues is redistributed as a lump sum transfer payment to agents in the economy.  
We find that the proportion of revenues allocated to environmental maintenance or 
improvement is inversely related to inequality.  That is, a direct transfer payment is 
likely to be the preferred mode of redistribution in this economy.  This is because a 
direct transfer implies larger utility gains as it can be spent on other goods in the 
economy and allows the agents to smooth consumption over time. Put differently, the 
public good in the utility function is non-excludable and non-rival in the sense that if 
benefits all agents in the economy in a uniform manner.  Consequently, the lump sum 
transfer is preferable in an economy with inequality since its benefits are felt to a 
greater degree by the poorer agents. 
  The second model looks at the preference over two different types of public goods, 
referred  to  as  “environment”  and  “publicly  provided  education”.    The  former  is 
modeled in a manner identical to the first model, i.e., it appears in the utility function.  
Education, on the other hand, enhances production and output as it is complementary 
input in the human capital formation of agents in the economy.  Again, the second 
public  good  is  labeled  as  “education”,  but  any  other  interpretation  which  is 
appropriate  to  the  features  modeled  would  suffice.    In  this  model,  however,  the proportion  spent  on  “environment”  is  unrelated  to  inequality.    Specifically,  this 
proportion is related only to the preference and technology related parameters of the 
model, an in particular negatively related to a parameter representing the returns to 
human capital. 
   An interesting implication of the above feature is that the parameter representing 
the returns to human capital impacts on the inequality in incomes, even though our 
model does not find a direct mathematical relationship between inequality and the 
proportion spent on the environment.  This suggests that one may empirically find a 
negative correlation between inequality and the proportion spent on environment even 
if a relationship of this type did not, in actual fact, exist. 
  The  analysis  suggests  that  the  existence  of  a  positive  or  a  negative  correlation 
between individual mechanisms of redistribution is contingent on the menu of choices 
that  are  available,  and  to  what  extent  each  alternative  is  effective  as  a  means  of 
redistribution.  Indirectly, this also implies that “pure” public goods may not be the 
preferred mechanism of distribution due to the “uniformity” of benefits associated 
with them.  One may also speculate that public goods with some degree of exclusion 
and rivalry in consumption would be preferred if the groups “excluded” constitute 
richer segments of society.  The opposite would be true if the public good benefited 
the  rich  to  a  greater  extent  than  the  poor.    Furthermore  institutional  features  of 
economies are likely to determine the excludability of various types of public goods, 
and  consequently  their  efficiency  as  mechanisms  of  redistribution.  Any  empirical 
research  that  finds  a  negative  or  positive  correlation  between  inequality  and 
redistribution must therefore be interpreted with caution. 
  Sections 2 and 3 present the two models and discuss the analytical and numerical 
results.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
 2. Model 1 
Consider  a  small  open  economy  in  which  time  is  discrete,  and  in  each  period 
t=0,1,2,…,  a  generation  of  two  period  lived  individuals  is  born.    There  is 
heterogeneity in the income endowment of individuals, which is in turn based on the 
heterogeneity in the endowment of abilities, and determined by the distribution F(.).  
Ability of individuals, within a generation, denoted by e, is indexed between 0 and 1, 
and the density function of each generation is denoted by  ) (e f , with ∫ =
1
0
1 ) ( de e f .  
The supply of labor by the young is inelastic and normalized to 1 unit.  However, the 
income earned as a result is related to the productivity ) (
i
t e h , where
i
t e  denotes the 
ability endowment of agent i born in t.  For convenience, we drop the superscript i 
from subsequent notation.  Labor income is then denoted ) ( t t t e h w , where  t w  is the 
wage rate at time t, and productivity is determined by the human capital production 
function  ( ) h h e e
y l = .  The wage and interest rates are taken as given by the individual 
agents, and are equal to the marginal product of labor and capital respectively.  Firms 
use a production function of the Cobb-Douglas form, so that: 
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where  K  and  H  represent  aggregate  physical  and  human  capital  respectively,  and 
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   The small open economy assumption essentially implies that the capital to human 
capital ratio is pinned down by the world interest rate, so that the wage and rental 
rates  above  are  given  and  assumed  constant  over  time.    Furthermore,  they  are 
essentially taken as given from the point of view of the agent’s optimization problem 
which we describe below.  For notational convenience, we let  t t h t y w e
y l =  in the 
analysis that follows. 
 
    Agents born in period t have preferences described by the following lifetime utility 
function: 
                                           1 1 1 1 1 ( , , , ) log( ) {log( ) log( )} (1) t t t t t t t u c c b a c c a b + + + + + = + +  
where  t c  and  1 + t c denote the agents consumption in the first and second period of life.  
The variable  1 + t a represents a public good, which we identify with something created 
as a result of the expenditure on “environmental quality”, which is financed by taxing 
the young in any given period.  However, only a proportion f of the tax revenue is 
used for expenditure on environmental quality.  Tax revenue in period t is given by: 
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Here,  t  represents the tax rate and  t y  is the mean income of the cohort born in 
period t.  Then,  1 t t a y ft + = , and the remainder of tax revenue is given to the young in 
period t as a lump-sum transfer  (1 ) t t TR y f t = - .  We assume that the young agents in 
period t vote on the proportion f  at the beginning of the period.
1  Individual budget 
constraints in periods t and t+1 may then be written as 
                                  (1 ) (2) t t t t c y s TR t = - - +  
                                    1 1 (1 ) . (3) t t t c r s + + = +  
In equations (2) and (3),  t t h t y w e
y l = represents the income endowment of the young 
in t,  1 t t s k + = represents their savings, and  r is the world interest rate, taken as given 
and constant by this small open economy.  
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1  Since environmental quality in t+1 does not affect the old in t, and lump sum transfers are made to 
the young in t, we do not believe this assumption is too restrictive.  With transfers given in the second 
period  of  life,  we  will  get  a  somewhat  sterile  result:  the  old  will  not  want  any  expenditure  on 
environmental protection, and the young will all want the same, as their preference are represented by 
the median voter.  In that case, the young will always determine the political outcome when there is 
positive population growth.  Furthermore, for the time being, we wish to abstract from issues relating 
to the intergenerational transfer of wealth, and focus on the effects of transfers within the generation.  
We also choose to include altruism via a bequest motive to minimize the aspect of intergenerational 
conflict.  
Substitution of these expressions and  1 t t a y ft + =  into the utility function, yields an 
indirect utility function as a function of  f , the agents income  t y , and the average 
income and wealth of the individual’s cohort  t y .  This function is described below: 
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In the above equation C is a constant term that is unrelated to f . Inspection of the 
above suggests that utility is non-monotonic in f .  Now individuals will essentially 
vote for f  that maximizes the above function.  Taking the partial derivative of the 
above and setting equal to zero, we can solve for the agents preferred equilibrium 
proportion of expenditure on the environment: 
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Note that the preferred proportion of spending is inversely related to the parameter 
n which can be used to characterize inequality in this economy.  Put differently, the 
lower the individual’s income and wealth relative to the average of his cohort, he or 
she will prefer a lower expenditure on environment.  Since preferences over  f  are 
single peaked, the median voter would vote for lowf when inequality is high – which 
is  the  case  when  mean  income  is  greater  than  median  income.    The  intuition 
underlying this result is as follows: In this model lump sum transfers directly given to 
agents  are  perfect  substitutes  for  current  consumption,  and  consequently  more 
effective as a mechanism of redistribution.  From the point of view of the poorer 
agents,  the  public  good  created  by  the  lump  sum  transfer  has  a  lower  degree  of 
excludability than the one appearing in the utility function.  In a relative sense, the 
benefits  from  the  lump-sum  transfer  are  greater  for  the  poorer  agents,  while  the 
impact of the environmental good is uniform across agents.   
   Note  also  that  f is  also  inversely  related  to  the  tax  rate.  This  is  probably  the 
implication of the fact that we have abstracted from the work effort decision and tax 
revenues are an increasing function of tax rates as there are no incentive effects on 
income.  Consequently, if the tax rate is high a lower proportion of the revenue may 
be devoted to the environment.  On the other hand, models that produce a Laffer 
curve may have different implications. 
 
3.  Model 2 
Now consider the same economy, but one in which the government is faced with a 
different choice in relation to the allocation of its revenues.  The model has features in 
common with Holtz-Eakin et al(2000), especially with respect to the modeling of 
human capital.            
We define human capital production by: 
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Here  ) ( t e h  is the human capital acquired by the agent with ability endowment  t e , 
t t t t de e h w g ∫ =
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) ( t is tax revenue, so that  t g ) 1 ( f - can be regarded as the amount of 
government  expenditure  allocated  to  education.    The  parameter  f   has  the  same 
interpretation as before – i.e it the proportion of government revenue allocated to the 
environment. 
    
   Using  the  same  methods  as  in  the  previous  model,  we  can  derive  equilibrium 
expressions  for  consumption,  saving,  and  bequests  and  consequently  obtain  the 
corresponding indirect utility function, which is given by: 
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Maximizing with respect to f  and manipulating the first order condition we get: 
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In  this  case,  the  proportion  spent  on  environment  is  unrelated  to  inequality  as 
characterized  by  the  parameter  n   in  Model  1,  or,  for  that  matter  any  other 
characterization of inequality.  However, this proportion will be correlated negatively 
with inequality, since larger values of the parameter y  cause greater inequality in the 
income distribution of agents in this economy.  This is intuitively obvious, since y  
represents  the  returns  to  human  capital  or  ability,  so  it  magnifies  the  existing 
inequality in the ability-endowment.  We illustrate this correlation using numerical 
experiments, which are summarized in Figure 1, which plots the Gini coefficient of 
the resulting income distribution for different values of y .
3 
                                                 
3   The underlying distribution of ability is held constant for all values of y .  In order to construct the ability 
distribution we draw a random sample of 501 values from a lognormal distribution with mean 3.7 and standard 
deviation 0.6.  we then normalize by dividing all values by the largest value in the sample.  For a given value of f , 
the amount of revenue devoted to education is determined as a fixed point.  That is, for given initial guess for the 
amount spent on the public good, incomes are affected which in turn impacts on the tax revenue raised, which 
impacts on the amount spent on the public good.  We repeat this process for each f  until there is convergence in the 
tax revenue raised.  
The discussion above has interesting implications for empirical research: one could 
find  a  negative  correlation  between  inequality  and  the  proportion  spent  on 
environment in the data, even if a relationship of this type did not, in actual fact, exist.  
Researchers finding such a correlation would then have to interpret their results with 
caution. 
   The intuition underlying the negative relationship between the parameter y  and the 
proportion  spent  on  the  environment  is  as  follows.    For  a  given  value  of  f ,  the 
amount of revenue spent on either public good is a constant, and essentially causes a 
parallel shift in the human capital production function, and the utility function of all 
agents.  For large values of y the shift in the production function may amount to a 
greater benefit in terms of utility than the direct shift of the utility function caused by 
increasing f .  While the increase in y  does increase inequality, agents may be better 
off in an absolute sense due to the increase in incomes at all levels.  Also, unlike the 
previous model, changes in f  (while holding y constant) do not have any impact on 
inequality. 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we explored the issue of public spending on alternative mechanisms of 
redistribution.    The  political  economy  models  analyzed  here  suggest  that  the  link 
between  inequality  and  redistribution  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  mechanism 
relative to the alternatives that are available.  We find that, in the presence of higher 
inequality, a median voter faced with the choice of the proportion of expenditure 
between two mechanisms is likely to choose in favour of public goods that are more 
efficient mechanisms of redistribution.  
   The  analysis  suggests  that  the  existence  of  a  positive  or  a  negative  correlation 
between individual mechanisms of redistribution is contingent on the menu of choices 
that are available.  Indirectly, this also implies that “pure” public goods may not be 
the preferred mechanism of distribution due to the “uniformity” of benefits associated 
with them.  One may also speculate that public goods with some degree of exclusion 
and rivalry in consumption would be preferred if the groups “excluded” constitute 
richer segments of society.  The opposite would be true if the public good benefited the  rich  to  a  greater  extent  than  the  poor.    Furthermore  institutional  features  of 
economies are likely to determine the excludability of various types of public goods, 
and  consequently  their  efficiency  as  mechanisms  of  redistribution.  Any  empirical 
research  that  finds  a  negative  or  positive  correlation  between  inequality  and 
redistribution must therefore be interpreted with caution. 
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